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Case No. 7614
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STATE OF UTAH
ROGER T. HARl\1STON, as Administrator
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston,
Deceased,
Appellant,
vs.
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK,
a Utah Corporation,
Respondent,
AND

ROGER T. HARlVISTON, as the Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased, HELEN E. GILLIS, MARION EUGENE HARMSTON,
ROGER T. HARlVISTON, AND FRED
HARMS TON,
Appellants,
vs.
KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and
EDGAR LABRUM and VIDA MURRAY
LABRUM, his wife,
Defendants.

PETITION FOR A RE-HEARING AND

F TIE IE
0 :~ T ;~

~) ·~

UI]RT THEREOF

, ,-:·2

J. RULON MORGAN,
ELIAS HANSEN,
-· ··-· ·-· ~ --~- ------ .., Attorneys for Respondents.

-·-~-,~--: - - - - -· - -· -· ·-· · · · · · -:_~
CJ.erk, Suprem""'\,.. ~\,.,..,. .'--,.'\_.,.,,.,.;r, ~.::.1~.
_ - ' Lt
\;v t ..4.tl... .tt

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
TOPICS
POINT ONE , _________________________________________________ ---------------------------- -·

1-2

THAT IN THE OPINION HERETOFORE HANDED
DOWN IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSES,
THIS COURT ERRED IN OVERLOOKING AND
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT ORDERED THE
FORECLOSURE OF THE M 0 R T GAGES INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTION
FOUND AS A FACT, "THAT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T.
HAR:JISTON, DECEASED, AND HE IS NOW THE
DULY APPOINTED, QUALIFIED AND ACTING
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED (TR. 101),
AS TO THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE FOR $4,500.00, (TR. 117) AND AS TO THE
FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE FOR $2,500.00. '' ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1-9

POINT TWOTHAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED, THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
"TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED
PAROL EVIDENCE TO- PROVE T H A T T H E
FACTS WERE DIFFERENT THAN SHOWN BY
THE RECORD" IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING
IN ISABELLE T. HARMSTON ESTATE.-------------------- 1-15
POINT THREETHAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED, THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 3rd ED., SEC. 2450,
HAMIL v. SCHLITZ BREWING CO., 165 lOW A 266;
145 N. W. 511; CAZELL v. CAZELL, 133 KAN. 766;
3 PAC. (2d) 479; IN RE BURNETT'S ESTATE, 11
CAL. (2d) 259; 79 PAC. (2d) 89; TURLEY v. TOBIN
(TEXAS), 7 S. W. (2d) 949, AND STATE v. POOLE,
68 MONT. 178; 216 PAC. 798, ANNOUNCE ANY
DOCTRINE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TRIAL
COURT E R R E D BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE
TOUCHING DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT THERE
WAS AN OATH OF OFFICE-OF ROGER T. HARM-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
STON IN THE FILES IN THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T. HARMSTON AT THE TIME OF THE
FORECLOSURE OF THE TWO MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY. ------------------------------ 1-18
POINT FOURTHIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
EVEN IF THE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN THIS A C T I 0 N, IT IS DOUBTFUL
WHETHER IT WAS SUFFICIENT TO UPHOLD
THE COURT'S ORDER TO CORRECT THE RECORDS, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NOT ONLY
WERE THE OATH OF OFFICE AND LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION MISSING FROM THE FILES,
BUT THERE IS ALSO LACKING ANY RECORD OF
SUCH FILING IN 1941 IN THE BOOK KEPT FOR
SUCH PURPOSE IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY CLERK. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2-19
POINT FIVETHIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "BY
ADMITTING EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING THE
RECORD IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING WITHOUT A DIRECT ISSUE IN THE PLEADINGS THAT
THE RECORD WAS NOT CORRECT, THIS COURT
CANNOT SAY THAT THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANTS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED. 2-21
CASES CITED
Atwood v. Cox, Utah 437; 55 Pac. (2d) 377 .... ---------------------------- 12
Barrett v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574; 106 Pac. 522 .... -------------------- 13
Cazell v. Cazell, 113 Kansas 766; Pac. (2d) 479________________________ 10
Erickson v. McCullough, 91 Utah 159; 63 Pac. (2d) 109........ 14
Hatch v. The Lucky Bill Mining Co., 25 Utah 405;
71 Pac. 865 --------------------------------------------------------------·--------------- 14
Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271; 75 Pac. (2d) 157.... -------------·

8

Jones v. Bonanza Mining & Milling Co., et al, 32 Utah 440;
91 Pac. 273 ______ ---------------- ___________________________ ----------------------- ______

14

Utah Credit Men's Assn. v. Bowman, 38 Utah 326;
113 Pac. 63 -----------·------------------------------ _____ ... ___________ ...... __ ___ ______

6

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
49 C.J .S., Sec. 201, page 359 .... ----------------·-···-··-·······----·-··-·---·--···---

6

Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), page 2145 .... ------------------------

17

STATUTES CITED
U. C.A. 1943, 104-1-7 ----------------- _----------······--------------·--·-··-····. ···--·--·

13

U. C.A. 1943, 104-1-8 ------······---------··········---------------------------------------

13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

S~UPREME

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROGER T. HARMSTON, as Administrator
of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton,
Deceased,
Appellant,

vs.
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK,
a Utah Corporation,
Respondent,
AND

ROGER T. HARMSTON, as the Administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased, HELEN E. GILLIS, MARION EUGENE HARMSTON,
ROGER T. HARMSTON, AND .FRED
HARMS TON,

Case No.

7614

Appellants,
v~.

KENNETH LABRUM and JEAN
CRUMBO LABRUM, his wife, and
EDGAR LABRUM and VIDA MURRAY
LABRUM, his wife,
Defendants.

PETITION F·OR A RE-HEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF'
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of Utah:
COME NOW the defendants in the two above entitled causes and move that this Court grant them, and
each of them, a re-hearing for the following reasons and
upon the following grounds:
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1. That in the opinion heretofore handed down in
the above entitled cause~, this Court erred in overlooking
and failing to consider the fact that the trial court at the
time it ordered the foreclosure of the mortgages involved
in the above entitled action found as a fact, "That Roger
T. Harmston has been appointed as administrator of
the Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, and he
is now the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased
(Tr. 101), as to the foreclosure of the mortgage for
$4,500.00, and (Tr. 117) as to the foreclosure of the
mortgage for $2,500.00."
2. That in its opinion heretofore rendered, this
Court erred in holding that the "trial court erred when
it admitted parol evidence to prove that the facts were
different than shown by the record" in the probate proceeding in Isabelle T. Harmston estate.
3. That in its opinion heretofore rendered, this
Court erred in concluding that Wigmore on Evidence,
3rd Ed., Sec. 2450, Hamill v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 165
Iowa 266, 145 N.W. 511; Caz-ell v. Cazell, 133 Kan. 766,
3 Pac. (2d) 479; In Re Burnett's Estate, 11 Cal. (2d)
259, 79 Pac. (2d) 89; Turley v. Tobin (Texas), 7 S.W.
(2d) 949 and State v. Poole, 68 Mont. 178, 216 Pac. 798
announce any doctrine to the effect that the Trial Court
erred by admitting evidence touching defendants' claim
that there was an oath of office of Roger T. Harmston
in the files in the Estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton at the
time of the foreclosure of the two mortgages involved
in this controversy.
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-!. This Court erred in concluding that even if the
evidence had been adn1is8ible in this action, it is doubtful \Yhether it \vas sufficient to uphold the court's order
to correct the records, in vie\v of the fact that not only
were the Oath of Office and Letters of Administration
missing fron1 the files, but there is also lacking any
record of such filing in 1941 in the book kept for such
purpose in the office of the County Clerk.
3. This court erred in holding that "By ad1nitting
evidence contradicting the record in the probate proceeding \vithout a direct issue in the pleadings that the
record \vas not correct, this Court cannot say that the
rights of appellants were not substantially affected."

WHEREF.ORE, defendants pray that a re-hearing
be granted in the above entitled causes to the end that
the errors above mentioned be corrected and the judgments appealed from be affirmed.
FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK,
KENNETH LABRUM, JEAN CRUMBO
LABRUM, his wife, EDGAR LABRUM
and VIDA LABRUM, his wife.
By J. RULON MORGAN and ELIAS
HANSEN,

Their Attorneys.

CERTIFICATE OF' MERITS
I, ELIAS HANSEN, one of the attorneys for the
defendants in the above entitled causes, hereby certify
that in my opinion there is merit to the foregoing Petition for a Re-Hearing, and that the record in said causes
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should be re-examined to the end that the errors above
mentioned be corrected and the judgment appealed from
affir1ned.
(Signed) ELIAS HANSEN
ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THAT IN THE OPINION HERETOFORE HANDED
DOWN IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE, THIS COURT
ERRED IN OVERLOOKING AND FAILING TO CONSIDER
THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT
ORDERED THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGES
INVOLVED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED ACTIONS FOUND
AS A FACT "THAT ROGER T. HARMSTON HAS BEEN
APPOINTED AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED, AND HE IS NOW
THE DULY APPOINTED, QUALIFIED AND ACTING
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T.
HARMSTON, DECEASED (TR. 101), AS TO THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE FOR $4500.00, AND (TR.
117) AS TO THE FORECLOSURE OF THE MORTGAGE
FOR $2500.00.

At the outset of this controversy it should be noted
that in each of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, the
trial court found "That Roger T. Harmston has been
appointed as administrator of the Estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased (Tr. 101 and 117)." In the opinion
heretofore written that fact has not been mentioned
and apparently it was overlooked. The fact that the
trial court has once determined that question is not
only evidence of the fact that Roger T. Harmston had
taken the oath of office when the mortgage foreclosure
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proceedings \Yere had, but as "~e read the authorities,
such finding of the court is of controlling i1nportance.
This is not a case "~here the defendant has not been
served 'vith suinmons. He \vas personally served by
the Sheriff of Duchesne County. In the summons so
personally served upon Roger T. Har1nston he is designated as the administrator of the estate of Isabelle T.
Harn1ston, deceased. Therefore, he must have known
that he \vas served as the administrator of such estate
because both the complaint and the sumn1ons designated
'"Roger T. Harmston, as administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased." If Roger T. Harmston
had entered his appearance in the mortgage foreclosure
proceeding and set up as a defense that he was not the
adlninistrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston,
deceased, and after a hearing was had on that issue the
Court had found, as it did in the mortgage foreclosure
proceedings, that Roger T. Harmston was the duly appointed and qualified administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, we think no one would contend
that after a lapse of nearly seven years, Roger T.
Harmston would or could be heard to come in and say
that the mortgage foreclosure proceeding should be set
aside because the court records in the matter of the
Estate of Isabelle T. Harmston fail t<? show that Roger
T. Harmston had taken an oath of office. In these cases,
Roger T. Harmston did not answer, but for nearly seven
years he did nothing notwithstanding the defendants
were in possession of the p-roperty that was foreclosed,
and a Sheriff's deed issued to the purchaser. Under
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this state of facts, it is proper to inquire, "Is not the
defendant bound by the trial court's finding in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings as effectively as if he had
actually appeared and contested the claim that he was
the qualified administrator of that estate~" As we read
the authorities, the answer to such question must be in
the affirmative. The authorities teach that the failure
of a defendant, who is personally served with summons,
constitutes admission of the facts alleged in a complaint.
The law in such particular is thus stated in 49 C.J.S.,
page 359, Sec. 201, "A default has been held to admit the
capacity in which plaintiff sues, that the defendant is
the person named in the writ and intended to be sued,
that he occupies the position or status, or fills the relation
to others which is alleged in the declaration, and that the
court has acquired jurisdiction of his person and of the
cause of action. It also admits the due execution and
validity of the instrument sued on, that plaintiff's claim
or demand is just and legal and that defendant has no
defense to the action." Numerous cases from both state
and federal courts are collected in footnotes which support the text. The case of Utah Cred:it Men's Association
v. Bowman, 38 Utah 326, 113 Pac. 63, is in harmony with
the text above cited and the cases in support thereof,
in that it is held that the Clerk of a court may enter
a judgment without taking evidence when the statute
so authorizes. It should be observed, however, that no
claim is made in this case that no evidence was taken to
establish the fact that Roger T. Harmston had taken
his oath of office. The evidence is all to the contrary.
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At the hearing of this case before the trial court, Roger
T. Harmston did not deny that he had taken the oath of
office prior to the tiine the 1nortgages \vere ordered foreclosed. Suppose the defendant, Roger T. Harmston, had
ans,Yered in the proceeding to foreclose the n1ortgages
and denied that he had taken an oath of office prior to the
tin1e of such proceeding and the evidence had been the
san1e as in this case, and the trial court had found as it
did in the present case and no appeal had been taken
attaching the finding that Roger T. Harmston was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, we believe no authority
can be found that would permit Roger T. Harmston to
wait nearly seven years and then come into court and
attack such finding solely upon the ground that the record
in the matter of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston fails
to show that he had taken the oath of office. To permit
this to be done would render judgments which are regular
on their face to be set aside upon the sole ground that
they were not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, and would reward a party defendant by permitting him to interpose his claimed defense after a
lapse of nearly seven years, notwithstanding the defendant has been in possession of the property involved in
the controversy without any claim by the plaintiffs and
has sold some of the property to a bona fide innocent
purchaser.
If judgments may be set aside under such a state
of facts, then indeed have judgments, which are in full
respects regular, lost the sanctity which this and the
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courts generally have accorded to them. Any examination of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding would not
reveal that Roger Harmston had not taJ_{en his oath of
office, but on the contrary, would show by the court's
expressed findings that he had taken his oath of office.
If the opinion heretofore written is to become the
law of this state, one could not safely rely on a judgn1ent
regular on its face which had stood for nearly seven years
without being attacked, but on the contrary must run the
risk that perchance some of the evidence offered in support of the judgment was erroneously received and did
not support the judgment. In many cases where default
judgments are taken without a reporter taking down the
evidence, it would be impossible to furnish the necessary
proof to sustain judgments. It is for that very reason
that this and other courts have uniformly held that:
"A judgment upon its face, or the judgment
roll upon inspection may show: First that the
Court had jurisdiction of the res and parties;
·second, that the Court did not have jurisdiction
of the res or the parties, or Third, the record may
be silent on the question of jurisdiction."
"In the first instance, the record supplies all
the evidence ; on the second instance, the record
itself shows the judgment void, and in the third
situation the record importing verity, jurisdiction in the court entering the judgment is presumed, since every court has the initial right and
duty to pass upon its own jurisdiction."

Intermill v. Nash, 94 Utah 271; 75 Pac. (2d)
157.
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In this case the judgn1ent on its face affirn1atively
sho,Ys that the Court had jurisdiction of the res and the
parties. Indeed no <: lain1 is or could successfully be made
that the court in the mortgage proceedings 'vas without
jurisdiction of Roger T. Harn1ston. l-Ie 'vas duly and
regularly personally served w·ith Sun1n1ons. Nor may
it be said that the Court 'vas 'vithout jurisdiction of the
res that is the property covered by the mortgage. A
lis pendens "~as filed. The property is in Duchesne
County 'vhere the court was held. District courts have
jurisdiction of 1nortgage foreclosures. The most that can
be said is that an examination of the probate proceedings in the Isabelle Harmston Estate fail to show that
Roger T. Harms ton had taken an oath of office at the
ti1ne of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings. The record
and files in that case do show that Roger T. Harmston
was appointed administrator and that he had furnished
a bond as by the Court order directed. Thus, if a sale
of property had been made or other acts performed by
Roger T. Harmston as administrator of the Estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, an application of the doctrine announced by this court in the case of Intermill v. Nash,
supra that when the record is silent on the question of
jurisdiction "the record importing verity, jurisdiction
in the court entering the judgment is presumed, since
every court has the initial right and duty to pass upon its
0"\\"71 jurisdiction." This case is, of course, much stronger
than would be a case where the question of whether or
not Roger T. Harmston had taken the oath of office was
directly brought in question in the matter of the estate of
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Isabelle T. Harms ton, deceased. In this case there is
a total absence of anything in the record of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding which shows or tends to show
that there was anything irregular or defective in those
proceedings. The records in those proceedings are all
to the contrary.
In the ca.se of 0 azell v. 0 azell, 133 Kan. 766 ; 3
Pac. (2d) 479, it is held that the Judge's recollection of
circumstances of rendering judgment and of the Court's
intention has force of evidence on question of property
of nunc pro tunc order to amend a decree of divorce.
If that be true, certainly the fact that the trial court in
the proceeding found that Roger T. Harmston was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of Isabelle T. Harmstron, deceased, is evidence,
and we believe under the authorities conclusive evidence
that Roger T. Harmstron was such administrator. It
should be kept in mind in this case tha.t even under plaintiff's theory, it is the burden of the Harmstons to secure
an amendment of the decree of foreclosure to the effect
that Roger T. Harmston was not the duly appointed,
qualified and acting administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, at the time of the
mortgage foreclosure. So long as such findings remain a
part of the record in those proceedings, the mortgage
foreclosures must stand because that is the only basis for
appellants' claim. Obviously, there cannot be a finding
in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding both ways on that
question or tha.t Roger T. Harmston was and was not
the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator
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of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston. In determining
that question certainly the finding of the trial court in
the mortgage foreclosure proceeding is evidence of the
fact, if not, as ""'e contend, conclusive evidence of the fact
that Roger T. Harn1ston 'vas the duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of that estate.
POINT II.
THAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE
THAT THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT THAN SHOWN BY
THE RECORD IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDING OF
ISABELLE T. HARMSTON, DECEASED.

None of the evidence offered by the defendants in the
trial of this case was calculated to establish any facts
that were at variance with the record in the matter of
the estate ?f Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. The most
that can pbssibly be said about such evidence is that it
tended to show that Roger T. Harmston in truth and fact
had taken an oath of office as administrator of that estate
and the same had been lost or destroyed. On the contrary, what had occurred in the estate of Isabelle T.
Harmston, deceased, was collateral to the issue in this
case.
The only issue in this case was whether or not the
trial court in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings had
jurisdiction to find that Roger T. Harmstrom was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of Isabelle T. Harmstrom's estate at the time of the
foreclosure of the mortgages. The evidence offered by the
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defendants was offered to establish the fact that the trial
court not only had jurisdiction to find such fact, but
that such finding was not erroneous, but was in accord
with the fact. It was the plaintiffs who were attacking
the judgments of the court in the mortgage foreclosure
proceedings and in furtherance of such attempt, sought
to show by the absence of any record of an oath of office
in the probate proceedings. What Roger T. Harmston
sought to show, and in order to prevail must show, is
that the trial court erroneously found in the mortgage
foreclosure proceedings that Roger T. Harmston was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased and apparently
because of such error, the trial court was without jurisdiction to decree a foreclosure of the property covered
by the mortgages. In passing, it may be observed that

even if, contrary to our contention, the trial court erroneously found that Roger T. Harmston was such administrator, such error would not deprive the· trial court of
jurisdiction. It is so held by this court in the case of
Atwood v. Cox, Utah 437; 55 Pac. (2) 377; where numerous authorities are collected.
Even if this were a proceeding in the matter of the
estate of Isabelle Harms ton, deceased, involving the
validity of some act of an appointed administrator, the
fact that the oath of office was absent from the files would
not render the act invalid. U.C.A. 1943, 104-1-7 provides:
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··No order or decree affecting the title to real
property heretofore or hereafter 1nade in any pro:bate or guardianship n1atter, shall be held to be
void at the suit or instance of any person clain1ing
adversely to the title of the decedent or ward, or
under a title not derived fron1 or through the decedent or 'vard, on account of any want of notice,
defect or irregularity in the proceedings, or of
any defect or irregularity in such order or decree,
if it appears that, before the order or decree was
entered, the executor, administrator or guardian,
as the case may be, was appointed by a court of
con1petent jurisdiction upon such notice as was
or may be prescribed by law; and in a probate
matter in 'vhich a competent court shall have appointed an executor, administrator or guardian
upon due notice, no objection to any subsequent
order or decree therein can be taken by any person claiming under the deceased or under the
ward, on account of any such want of notice·, defect or irregularity, in any other manner than
on direct application to the same court, made at
any time before distribution, or on appeal."
U.C.A., 1943, 104-1-8 provides:
"An object to any paper, petition, decree or
order in any probate or guardianship matter, for
an erroneous or defective statement or determination of any fact necessary to jurisdiction which actually existed, or for an omission to find or state
any such fact in such paper, petition, decree or
order, is available only on direct application to the
same court, or on appeal."
The statutes above cited are construed in the cases
of Barrett v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574; 106 Pac. 5·22 and
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Erickson v. McCullough, 91 Utah 159; 63 Pac. (2d) 109.
This court has also held in the case of Hatch v. The Lucky
Bill Mining Co., 25 Utah 405; 71 Pac. 865 that where the
, directors of a corporation have taken an oath of office
but neglected to file the same as by law required "the
irregularity is not of sufficient importance to authorize
a court of equity to set aside the proceedings (the levying of an assessrnen t) and especially so where, as in this
case, no one appears to have been mislead or injured
thereby." To the same effect is the case of Jones v.
Bonanza Mining & Milling Co. et al, 32 Utah 440; 91 Pac.
273.
While the foregoing statutes are not directly in point,
they do show that the legislative branch of government
and the courts of equity are very reluctant to set aside
decrees of courts, especially courts of general jurisdiction
because of some irregularity or omission not going to
jurisdiction. If as the authorities just cited hold, irregularities or omissions invalidating title to real estate may
not be maintained "in any other manner than on direct
application to the same court, made at any time before
distribution or on appeal" where an administrator has
been appointed upon due notice, then for much stronger
reasons the title to real estate may not be successfully
attacked where, as here, the court found that Roger T.
Harmston was the duly appointed, qualified and acting
adn1inistrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston at the
time the decrees foreclosing the mortgages were entered.
In its opinion, the Court seems to attach considerable
importance to the fact that our statute, (U.C.A. 1943, 102-
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5-l) requires the clerk to record letters of administration
to ,,·hich the oath of office is attached in books to be kept
by hin1 in his office for that purpose, but no such record
\Vas made. Of course, if, as the evidence shows, the oath
of office disappeared soon after it was taken and before
a record \vas made thereof, it is of no special significance
that it does not appear of record. Obviously, when the
letters of adn1inistration and the oath of office attached
thereto disappeared, the same could not be recorded.
IJOINT III.
THAT IN ITS OPINION HERETOFORE RENDERED
THIS COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE, 3rd Ed. Sec. 2450, HAMILL v. SCHLITZ
BREWING CO., 165 Iowa 266; 145 N.W. 511; CAZELL v.
CAZELL, 133 Kan. 766; 3 Pac. (2d) 479; IN RE BURNETT'S
ESTATE, 11 Cal. (2d) 259; 79 Pac. (2d) 89; TURLEY v. TOBIN
(TEXAS) 7 S.W. (2d) 949 AND STATE v. POOLE, 68 Mont.
178, 216 Pac. 798 ANNOUNCE ANY DOCTRINE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING
EVIDENCE TOUCHING DEFENDANTS' CLAIM THAT
THERE WAS AN OATH OF OFFICE OF ROGER T. HARMSTON IN THE FILES IN THE ESTATE OF ISABELLE T.
HARMSTON AT THE TIME OF THE FORECLOSURE OF
THE TWO MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN THIS CONTROVERSY.

We have carefully examined the foregoing authorities and cases, but as we read them they are not applicable to the facts in this case. In none of those cases does
it appear that in the case immediately before the court,
the validity of which is being brought in question, is there
a finding, which if true, defeats the claim that the court
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was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. In
this case there is a total absence of any evidence of any
infirmaties in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings.
In order to find any evidence to support appellant's
claim, he must not only go outside of the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, but he must ignore or strike down
the finding that Roger T. Harmston was the duly appointed qualified and acting administrator of the estate of
Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased. Looking solely to the
failure of the records in the Isabelle T. Harmston estate
to show that Roger T. Harms ton had taken an oath of
office and the express finding in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings that he had taken the 'oath of office
prior to the time of the entry of the decree of foreclosure,
it would seem that the latter is entitled to at least greater
weight than former.
The cases and authorities cited in the opinion are
founded on the proposition that a judgment should be full
and complete within itself and that one who seeks relief
under a judgment must first secure a full and complete
judgment. That doctrine has no application here because
in this case there is no infirmity in the foreclosure proceedings. They are full and complete in every particular. The appellants and not the respondents are seeking
to have the judgment changed. If the judgment in the
mortgage foreclosure proceeding, after a lapse of nearly
seven years, may attack and have held for naught the
findings of fact in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings
because of a claim th~t there was not proper evidence
to support the same by reason of the failure of the record
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in the probate proceedings to reveal that Roger T. Harmston had taken an oath of office in that estate, there is
no reason "\Yhy the n1ortgage foreclosure proceeding n1ay
not be attacked because of a failure of some other probate
proceeding record through 'vhich Isabelle Harmston acquired title fails to show that the administrator thereof
failed to take the oath of office and thus cast upon the
person claiming title through a mortgage foreclosure
the burden of showing that such an oath of office was
taken notwithstanding the court in such other probate .
proceedings had found that an oath of office had been
taken.
~Ioreover the great weight of authority as we find
then1 is against those cited in the opinion heretofore
rendered in this case.
The matter of the proof of proceedings in courts
is discussed in Freeman on Judgments-Fifth Edition,
page 2145. It is there stated that in some states it is
necessary to re-establish a judgment-roll before it may
be admitted in evidence, but then goes on to say: This
view is in conflict with that expressed by Mr. Greenleaf
in his work on Evidence, in which he lays down the following rule: "If the record is lost and is ancient, its existence and contents may sometimes be presumed, but
whether it be ancient or recent, after proof of the loss,
its contents may be proved, like any other document, by
any secondary evidence where the case does not from its
nature disclose the existence of other and better evidence." In a footnote to the text, it is stated that the rule
stated by Greenleaf is beyond doubt sustained by the
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weight of authority. Numerous cases from both federal
and state courts are cited in footnote Number 15. We have
examined such cases and they support the text. It would
extend this brief to an unreasonable length to review all
of the cases there cited and to do so would probably not
substantially add to respondents' position because in
those cases, as well as those cited by the court in its
opinion, the situation presented to the court was one
in which a judgment was relied upon and sought to be
enforced in the proceeding directly brought in question.
No such question is here presented. Here, as we have
repeatedly pointed out, the decrees of foreclosures were
free from any and all infirmity. In order to make out a
case casting any question of the validity of the decrees
of foreclosure, resort was had to an entirely different
proceeding from the one brought in question. In our investigation, we have been unable to find a case or other
authority where that doctrine has been applied to facts
similar to those here involved. Indeed the trial court
having found in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding
that Roger T. Harmston was at the time of the mortgage
foreclosure proceeding the duly appointed qualified and
acting administrator of the estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, it would seem to be a useless proceeding
to have the court again make such a finding if indeed
the respondents have such an interest as will entitle them
to 1naintain such a proceeding in light of the fact that
they have already such a finding and of the further fact
that Roger T. Harmston wa.s such administrator of that
estate at the time of the trial. Certain it is that the trial
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court could not \Yell1nake a finding that Roger T. Ha.rinston \Yas not such administrator until and unless it first
set aside the finding in the 1nortgage foreclosure proceedings that Harn1ston \Yas surh administrator. The law
abhors inconsistent findings as bet,Yeen the same parties
"~here there is involved the sa1ne property rights.

POINT I\T.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT EVEN IF
TIIE EVIDENCE HAD BEEN ADMISSIBLE IN THIS ACTION, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT WAS SUFFICIENT
TO UPHOLD THE COURT'S ORDER TO CORRECT THE
RECORDS, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT NOT ONLY
WERE THE OATH OF OFFICE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION MISSING FROM THE FILES, BUT THERE IS
ALSO LACKING ANY RECORD OF SUCH FILING IN 1941
IN THE BOOK KEPT FOR SUCH PURPOSE IN THE OFFICE
OF THE COUNTY CLERK.

We have in part at least discussed the question which
we wish to raise under this heading.
The only evidence which lends any support to the
claim that Roger T. Harmston did not take an oath of
office is the fact that the record of the probate proceedings fail to show that such oath of office was taken.
Roger T. Harmston, though present in court at the time
of the hearing, did not deny that he had taken the oath
of office. The evidence of Rulon Morgan is that he had
the files in the probate proceedings before him at the time
of the hearing of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.
The clerk and his two assistants all testified that when he
wrote a letter, such as the one written to Mr. Morgan
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stating that an oath of office had been taken by Mr.
Harmston, he, the clerk, always had before him the record
concerning which he_wrote and what is of greater weight,
if not conclusive, is the fact that the trial court found that
Roger T. Harmstron was the duly appointed, qualified
and acting administrator of the estate of Isabelle T.
Harmstron when the mortgage foreclosure proceedings
·were had. In addition thereto, is the fact that notwithstanding Roger T. Harmston was sued as such administrator, personally served with summons as such adn1inistrator, yet he failed to answer or deny such fact until
nearly seven years after the foreclosure decree was
entered.
In light of these facts, some of which were apparently
overlooked because they are not mentioned in the opinion,
we most earnestly urge that this cause be reconsidered.
It seems, to say the least, unlikely that an attorney-at-law
w_ould be so forgetful of his duties as to fail to assure
hi1nself that an oath of office had been taken by the person against whom suit is being brought to foreclose a
n1ortgage executed by one who is deceased, or that he
would testify, as did Mr. Morgan in this case, that the
oath of office was in the files at the time of the entry
of the decree of foreclosure. It seems equally improbable
that the trial judge would be so neglectful of his duties
as to find as a fact that Roger T. Harmston was the
duly appointed, qualified and acting administrator of the
estate of Isabelle T. Harmston, deceased, if such were
not the fact. So also Mr. Harmston was personally served
with summons as the administrator of the estate of Mrs.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
Har1nston on May 13, 19-!1, yet he paid no attention to
the fact that he \Vas so served and that the Farmers and
~Ierchants Bank has been in possession of the Inortgaged
property and collected the rents and profits therefro1n
since l\Iarch 12, 19-!2, when it secured a Sheriff's Deed
until the present action \Vas brought. If such evidence is
not sufficient to show that an oath of office was taken
by Harmston, then indeed have judgments and decrees
lost the sanctity which, as we have heretofore pointed
out, have been most zealously upheld by the authorities
generally, as well as by this court.
POINT V.
THIS COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "BY ADMITTING EVIDENCE CONTRADICTING THE RECORD IN THE
PROBATE PROCEEDING WITHOUT A DIRECT ISSUE IN
THE PLEADINGS THAT THE RECORD WAS NOT CORRECT, THIS COURT CANNOT SAY THAT THE RIGHTS
OF APPELLANTS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTED."

While it is true that there is no direct issue in the
pleadings that the record in the probate proceedings
were not correct, it is also true that there was no occasion
to try out in this proceeding the matters involved in the
probate proceedings. In order to show that the court
was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of foreclosure, the appellants offered the record in the probate
proceedings to show that Roger T. Harmston had not
taken an oath of office and the respondents offered evidence that he had taken an oath of office. As we understand the law it is not the function of pleadings to raise
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issues as to the admissibility of evidence to support or
defeat an issue in a case. The issue in this case was
whether or not the court had jurisdiction to enter the
decree of foreclosure and what occurred in the probate
proceedings was not and could not well be made an issue
by the pleadings. It is elementary that evidence need
not be pleaded. Moreover, if it were necessary that an
issue be made in the pleadings of such nature it was the
appellants and not the respondents duty to raise such
issue. They were the ones who brought into these cases
the matter of the failure of Roger T. Harmston to take an
oath of office. If it were necessary to make an issue in
the pleadings upon that question that burden was on the
appellants as they were the ones who sought relief from
the mortgage foreclosures. That being so, the appellants
may not be heard to complain if they failed to allege the
facts necessary to have the foreclosure proceedings set
aside. The only pleading required of the respondents was
a general denial of the allegations relied upon by the appellants for relief. If, as we have heretofore contended,
the rights of the appellants were lawfully foreclosed,
then, of course, the rights of the appellants may not be
said to be affected, because if the foreclosure proceedings
are to be sustained, the appellants are without any rights.
We submit that a rehearing should be granted to the
end that the cause be re-examined and the errors abo:ve
mentioned be corrected and the judgment appealed from
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. RULON MORGAN
ELIAS HANSEN
Attorneys for Responde:nts
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